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THE LAW

A New Approach to the Fourth Amendment
in Light of Proposition Eight
By Robert K. Calhoun, Jr.
It has now been almost two and
one-half years since the California
electorate passed Proposition 8 and
attempted, with one scatter-shot provision, to change much of the criminal
justice landscape in California. Despite
this significant passage of time, only
two of the many issues raised by Proposition 8 have been resolved with any
clarity by the California Supreme
Court: The constitutional adequacy of
the election process which produced
Proposition 8 (Brosnahan v Brown
(1982) 32 Ca13d 236), and the non-retroactivity of its provisions (People v
Smith (1983) 34 Ca13d 251).
While its many provisions present a
bonanza of potential issues requiring
resolution by the Court, perhaps no
other is of such sweeping importance
as that of the effect of Article 1 section
28 (d) (the so-called "Right to Truth-inEvidence") upon that vast body of
independent state law that the California courts have developed in recent
years in reliance upon the California
Constitution-i.e., whether Article 1
section 28 (d) does away with an exclusionary remedy for California's independent state law and imposes, in its
stead, a federal standard for all suppression issues.
It is not the intent of this article to
canvass the arguments that can and
have been made with respect to Proposition 8's ultimate effect upon rules
of exclusion (except to note in passing
that the issue is one which is very
much alive-thanks in large part to
the sloppy drafting of the authors of
Proposition 8).
It is also not the intent here to
suggest that the proposition's effect
upon rules of exclusion can be reduced
to a single discreet issue. To a large
extent, it presents as many issues as
there are rights which are currently
enforced in California by an exclusionary remedy-for example, a decision
that Proposition 8 mandates an end to
exclusionary rule enforcement for independent California search and seizure
law does not necessarily mean the
18 I
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same result for the independent body
of law developed pursuant to California's privilege against self-incrimination (Article 1, section 15) and the
Miranda decision since Article 1 section 28 (d) by its very terms exempts
"statutory rule [s] of ... privilege"
from its swtfep (and constitutional
provisions are "statutes" under California's Evidence Code)"
The purpose of this article is instead
quite simple. It confines itself to the
area of search and seizure law and begins by assuming the worst-that the
Court eventually rules that a federal
standard applies to all such suppression issues. It then goes on to propose
an argument which is intended to
rescue as much of California's independent search and seizure law as is
possible. (For most of you, of course,
there is no need to assume the worst.
Substantial numbers of the state's
trial judges already view Proposition
8 as having achieved such a result and
are busily applying the federal standard. This merely provides you with
the opportunity to give this argument
an early audition.)
The argument can best be summarized as follows: The scope of the
Fourth Amendment is defined in terms
of expectations of privacy. Concepts
of privacy have historically been associated with state law. State law, thus,
may still be relevant to the exclusionary issue-not as an independent
basis of exclusion, but as a potential
means of expanding the scope of the
Fourth Amendment itself.

Reasonable expectation
of privacy
Ever since the Court decided Katz v
U.S. 399 U.S. 347 in 1967, we have de-

fined the basic sweep of the Fourth
Amendment in terms of personal privacy: i.e. the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment even applies to
particular police activity (i.e. whether
there has been a "search") is defined
ICalif. Evid. Code §230.

in terms of whether the government
has invaded a person's reasonable expectation of privacy2; the question of
which individuals have access to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment
(i.e. standing) has been translated into
a question of whose reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. 3
The problem, of course, with formulating these issues in this way is that
Katz and its progeny have given us
virtually no guidance in determining
which privacy expectations are reasonable and which are not. This is
hardly surprising. Prior to Katz,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
grounded in notions of property law,
so one would not expect prior Fourth
Amendment cases to be particularly
enlightening on the latter issue.
Moreover, to the extent the Court
might wish to look to a federal law of
privacy outside the Fourth Amendment
arena, authority around the time of
Katz was scant to say the least, since
the constitutional right to privacy had
only been "created" two years before
in very narrow terms in Griswold v
Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479. Thus,
as Mr. Justice Stewart recognized in
his majority opinion in Katz:
"The protection of a person's general right
to privacy-his right to be left alone by
other people-is, like the protection of his
property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual states. "4

And that, pure and simple, is the
basis of the argument here: that to the
extent the court is called upon to determine the reasonableness of privacy
expectations, it is, of necessity, compelled to look not only at whatever
federal law there may be on the subject, but also the law of the individual
state in which the case arises. (In the
case of California, that is an argument
of some significance because in a
variety of ways California stands out
dramatically in terms of the vigor with
2Katz v U.S. (1967) 389 U.S. 347. (This oftquoted language actually comes from Mr.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion).

which it protects personal privacy-a
matter which will be developed at
length below).

State privacy provisions
Besides the dearth of available
federal law, the idea of looking to the
states for help in defining privacy
makes sense for a number of other
reasons. Primary among these is the
fact that-as Stewart recognized in
Katz-the states had in fact been developing a body of privacy law long before
Katz and Griswold came upon the
scene. At the time of Katz, a firm
majority of the states recognized some
form of right to privacy as part of
their tort law. s A few even contained
explicit provisions in their constitutions
protecting privacy.6 As of today, those
numbers have increased so that a tort
of privacy is recognized by a total of
46 states and the District of Columbia7
and at least 10 states 8 have some form
of explicit privacy provision in their
constitutions. Morever, a substantial
number of states, such as California
have developed an impressive body ~f
statutory law 9 protecting the privacy
rights of their citizens. If the Katz
question really does ask which privacy
expectations "society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable," it is difficult to conceive of a better answer
than those instances where society
has actually spoken-either through
its legislatures, initiative processes or
courts.
There is yet another-perhaps more
important-reason to look to state law
on these matters. As we as a nation
struggle to fine-tune the balance
between the needs of effective law
enforcement and the individual's need
for privacy in a post-1984 world, it is
becoming increasingly evident that
the concept of privacy that the United
States Supreme Court has begun to
develop in recent years lO bears little
relationship to the concept of privacy
3Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128.
4Katz, supra at pp. 350-351.
537 Mont. L. R. 39, f.n. 4.
6Id at pp. 43.44.
7Id at p. 39, f.n. 4. Cf West's Wisc. Stats.
Ann. §895.50; Rev. Stats. of Nebr. §20-201;
Gen. Laws of R.I. § 9-1-28.1.
sOp. Cit. at pp. 43-45.
9S ee, for example, Invasion of Privacy Act
(Calif. P.C. §630·637.5) and Right to
Financial Privacy Act (Gov't Code §§
7460-7493, plus amendments to several
other codes.)

that has developed in a number of the
individual states. (Probably no better
example of this can be found than in
California-a matter which also will
be developed below).
If the citizens of a given state do, in
fact, define privacy more broadly than
does the present court, and they do so
in some fashion that may be readily
and easily determined by the Court,
then there is no reason in precedent
or in policy why Fourth Amendment
theory should not incorporate that
state law as a separate, supplemental
source of legitimization for an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy. Independent state ground
theory presently permits the states
the freedom to provide increased pro·
tections for their citizens through the
independent operation of their own
state constitutions l l (provided they do
not undercut the minimum nationwide
standard required by the U.S. Constitution as established by the Court).
The theory proposed here is quite
similar although it differs in one
crucial respect. It would allow states
to provide greater protection to their
citizens by legitimizing greater privacy
expectations than otherwise exist in
federal law.
The difference is that it would
protect these expectations through
the operation of the Fourth Amendment and the enforcement powers of
the federal courts. The states would,
in effect, be allowed to define the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. That
would mean, of course, that the scope
of the Fourth Amendment protections
would vary from state to state. This
should not be so strange as it first
appears if we are in fact talking about
the legitimacy of privacy expectations,
since it should be obvious that, in reality, societal understandings as to which
privacy expectations are reasonable
vary enormously from state to state. 12
Moreover, this "federalization" of the
scope question of the Fourth Amendment is hardly heresy. The U.S.
Supreme Court has for some time
looked to state law to give content
and meaning to a number of other
lOSee, for example, U.S. v Miller (1976) 425
U.S. 435 and Smith v Md. (1979) 442 U.S.
735.
l1Cooper v Calif. (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62.
12Dash, Schwartz, & Knowlton, "The
Eavesdroppers" Da Capo Press, 1971
at p.8.
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provisions of the U.S. Constitution,
including the Due Process Clause,13
the Contract Clause l4 and the First
Amendment,lS to name a few.
No less a champion of "States'
Rights" than Mr. Justice Rehnquist
himself seems to have advocated something very close to this theory in a
recent standing case. Speaking for the
majority in Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439
U.S. 128, he said (at f.n. 12):
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautotological to fall back on the notion that those
expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding
exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases.
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by
law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law
or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society.

Of course, he never refers specifically to state law here but his reference
to property law in conjunction with
"societal understandings" which have
their source beyond the terms of the
Fourth Amendment itself is noteworthy
in that property law has traditionally
13Board of Regents v Roth (1972) 408 U.S.
564.
14Indiana ex reI Anderson v Brand (1938)
303 U.S. 95.
15Miller v Calif. (1973) 413 U.S. 15.
FORUM /
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been viewed as a preserve of the states.
For example, in Board of Regents v
Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, Rehnquist
was part of a majority that held that:
"Property interests, of course, are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such
as state law . .. "16

Ample precedent
Actually, there is ample precedent
for the proposition that federal courts
can look to state law to determine the
parameters of federal law. Probably
the most compelling example is to be
found in the procedural due process
decisions of the Court over the past
decade.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the states from depriving any individual of "life, liberty, or property" without due process of law. In determining
what standard of fairness to apply to
state governmental action, the Court
has utilized a number of different
analytical modelsP But since 1972,
when it decided Morrisey v Brewer
(1972) 408 U.S. 471 and Board of
Regents v Roth, supra, the Court has
tended to follow a two step mode of
analysis: the first step being a threshold determination of whether the
interests of the affected individual rise
to the level of "life, liberty or property"
(i.e. whether the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable at all); and the
second step (assuming a positive
answer to the first) being a determination of what process is due. 18
What is significant for our purposes
about this line of cases is that, in
determining the first issues (whether
there is a "liberty" or "property"
interest involved) the court has
increasingly looked to state law for
the answer.
For example, in Board of Regents v
Roth, supra, the Court held that nontenured instructors at a state university
did not have a protectable "property"
interest in their continued employment
sufficient to guarantee them some
form of procedural protections prior to
their termination because the applicable state law had not created a
"legitimate claim of entitlement." 19
'6Roth, supra at p. 577.
17Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional
Law, 2d Ed. pp. 528-530.
18Morrisey v Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972).
20 I FORUM I January·February 1985

This approach was required, according
to the Court, because property interests "are not created by the constitution. Rather they are created and
their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source
such as state law." 20
Similarly, in Paul v Davis (1976) 424
U.S. 693, the Court observed that
"liberty" interests were every bit as
difficult to define as "property"
interests for purposes of the Due
Process Clause and that often "these
interests attain this constitutional
status by virtue of the fact that they
have been initially recognized and
protected by state law." 21 The Court
then declined to find that petitioner
had a "liberty" interest in avoiding
governmental defamation (despite a
long line of previous Supreme Court
authority to the contrary)22 unless the
defamation was accomplished by
interference with some other more
"tangible" interest created by state
law 23-which they found not to be the
case on the facts of Paul v Davis.
Thus, the Court has done in the
procedural Due Process area exactly
what is being proposed be done in the
area of the Fourth Amendment
enforcement. They have used state
law to determine the threshold
question of the applicability of a
federal constitutional right.
It should probably be noted that
Roth and Paul and the cases which
follow them 24 have been severely
criticized25 and that the principle of
deference to state law which they
articulate has evolved as part of an
overall pattern of limiting access to
the federal courts. A cynic might
question whether the Court is truly
prepared to defer to state law if its
effect would actually be to expand the
scope of federal constitutional protections. A positive answer may be found
in a recent prison transfer case, Hewitt
v Helms (1983) 459 U.S. 460. There the
'9Roth, supra at p. 577.
2°Id at p. 577.
21Paul v Davis (1976) 424 U.S. 693, 710.
22See, for example, Wisconsin v
Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433.
230p. Cit. at p. 707.
24See, for example, Arnett v. Kennedy
(1974) 416 U.S. 134 and Bishop v Wood
(1976) 426 U.S. 341.
25See Monaghan, "Of 'Liberty' and
'Property'," 62 Corn. L.R. 405.

Court reiterated its position that the
transfer of an inmate to less amenable
and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons fails to implicate any
"liberty" interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. The Court went on,
however, to find that the state of Pennsylvania had itself created a liberty
interest. This conclusion was based
upon state statutes and regulations
which required certain procedures to
be followed prior to placing someone
in administrative segregation, as well
as the fact that the state had established "specific substantive predicates"
before administrative segregation
could be imposed. 26 Our cynic might
point out that the Court nevertheless
went on to determine that the procedural protections actually provided by
the state were constitutionally sufficient. Nonetheless, the fact cannot
be overlooked that firm authority exists
not only for the proposition that the
scope of constitutional protections
may, in appropriate circumstances, be
defined by reference to state law but
also that this may result in more
expansive application of the federal
constitutional right.
This principle is not limited to procedural due process cases. A similar
approach may be found, for example,
as part of traditional analysis under
the Contract Clause. Article 1 section
10 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that no state shall pass any law
impairing the obligation of contracts.
Here again we find the U.S. Supreme
Court declaring that the threshold
issue "as to the existence and nature
of the contract [is] ... one primarily
of state law." 27 Thus, the contract
clause essentially throws a federal
constitutional shield around property
interests initially created by state law 28
and, in so doing, makes the scope of
the federal right dependent upon the
prior state law question.

Applicable to obscenity cases
Yet another example of "societal
understandings" of a state or local
nature determining the scope of rights
under the federal constitution may be
found in the area of recent First
Amendment obscenity law. Here the
threshold question concerning the
scope of the constitutional right is a
26Hewitt v Helms (1983) 459 U.S. 460, 470.
27 Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, supra.
28Monaghan, supra at p. 435.

determination of whether the disputed
material is "obscene" or not. A determination that certain material is obscene is a determination that it simply
is not covered by the protections of the
First Amendment. (Roth v u.s. (1975)
354 U.S. 476 at 485.)
In making this threshold determination as to obscenity, juries are currently asked to decide among other
things, whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient
interests. (Roth v U.S., supra a(p. 489.).
What is significant about this for
our purposes is that, at least since
1973 when the Court decided Miller v
California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, the jury
is instructed to make this decision by
applying statewide standards of offensiveness and prurience rather than
national standards because, according
to chief Justice Burger, "[O]ur Nation
is simply too big and too diverse for
this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated
for all 50 states in a single formulation,
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists." (Miller, supra at p. 30).
Moreover, this rule with respect to
the application of state standards has
been held to apply in federal court as
well, determining the sweep of First
Amendment protections for federal
obscenity prosecutions as well as for
those based upon state law. (Hamling
v U.S. (1974) 418 U.S. 87.)
Consequently, the sweep of the First
Amendment expands or shrinks in
direct relationship to the "societal
understandings" of the various states.
This is viewed positively by Chief Justice Burger to the extent that he finds
"It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York City."
(Miller, supra, at p. 32).
On the other hand, this "federalization" of the scope of First Amendment
protection has been severely criticized
for the possible chilling effect it may
have upon expression and the potential
it raises for local censorship and political opportunism. 29 But the ultimate

Ramifications of theory
Assuming this theory is viable, what
would it actually mean in application?
In a state such as California, which
has a very substantial body of law protecting the privacy rights of its citizens,
I think its effects would be quite
significant.
Its primary effect would be realized
with respect to that substantial body of
California case law that speaks directly
to the Katz question. To the extent that
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29"Community Standards and the
Regulation of Obscenity," 24 DeP. L. R.
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the CalifornIa courts have made a specific determination as to whether a
given privacy expectation is reasonable
or not and, thus, have provided the federal courts with authority that is clearcut and readily discernible, the
California approach should contr61for the reasons set forth in the first
half of this article (subject, of course,
to the caveat we encounter in the independent state ground area that state
courts cannot undercut the minimum
standards established by the United
States Supreme Court).
A critic might challenge this assertion, contending that the body of independent state privacy law that we wish
to rely upon is part and parcel of the
very state law that has been presumed
lost to Proposition 8's "Right-to-truthin-Evidence," i.e. that what cannot be
done directly with California law also
cannot be done indirectly.
Ignoring the intriguing question of
whether the electorate really could
have had something so specific as this
in mind when it passed Proposition 8,
let us move on to what does seem to
be a very obvious answer to our critic.
Article I section 28 (d) ("The Right-toTruth-in-Evidence"), by its very terms,

wisdom of Miller (or, for that matter,
any of the Court's attempts to regulate
obscenity) is not what is before us.
What recommends this aspect of the
obscenity laws to our attention is the
fact that it represents yet another
example of the Court determining the
scope of a particular federal constitutional right by explicit reference to
some aspect of state law or local
"societal understandings" and buttresses our argument that such an
approach is appropriate in the Fourth
Amendment arena where the scope of
the constitutional protections depends
upon a determination of whether a
given expectation of privacy is reasonable or not.
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does not rescind any California constitutional protections. All it purports to
accomplish is the abrogation of an
exclusionary remedy to enforce the
substantive provisions of California'a
independent state constitutional law.
Independent California law is looked
to but the theory in no way depends
upon an exclusionary remedy to
enforce California law. It does utilize
the exclusionary rule-but only in the
service of the Fourth Amendment. It
must be re-emphasized that we are
talking about federal rights here.
California law becomes relevant only
as a means of interpreting those rights.
And, of course, pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution,30 the exclusionary rule
for federal search and seizure law,
made applicable to the states in Mapp
v Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, can in no
way be undermined by Proposition 8.
Moving specifically to the Katz question, it is fair to say that this is an area
where the California Supreme Court
has spoken frequently and forcefully.
The Court has relied primarily upon
Article 1 section 13 of the California
Constitution 3! (the state search and
seizure provision) although "coexistensive" authority has been found to
emanate from California's Article 1
section 1 right to privacy.32 (Indeed, at
least two justices are of the opinion
that Article 1 section 1 mandates even
broader privacy protections than have
been developed to date under traditional Article 1 section 13 analysis}.33

Courts divided on privacy
Whatever the basis, the case law is
impressive. It undoubtedly marks the
California Supreme Court's most
striking division with the U.S. Supreme
Court in the area of search and seizure
law. The two courts are literally talking
about different concepts of privacy.
This is probably made clearest in the
area of informational privacy. In the
30U.S. Const. art VI, c1.2.
31"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and
searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons and things to
be seized."
32People v Crowson 33 Ca13d 623 at 629.
33Id at pp. 638-639 (dissent by Bird with
Reynoso concurring).

area of bank records (Burrows v
Superior Court (1974) 13 Ca13d 238),
credit records (People v Blair (1979) 25
Ca13d 640), and telephone records
(Blair, supra and People v Chapman
(1984) 36 Ca13d 98), the California
Court has developed a theory of
privacy that recognizes that the exigencies of modern life require the
individual to provide all sorts of
personal data to numerous state and
private bureaucracies; that in doing
so, the individual has no realistic
choice but to comply (only people in
law school hypotheticals choose not to
use banks, phones, credit cards, etc.);
but that it is still reasonable for such
a person to expect that those bureaucracies which have been given a
glimpse of his or her personal life will
use the data only for valid internal
purposes rather than misuse it by disclosing it indiscriminately to the outside world for totally unrelated
purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court, on
the other hand has, to quote Chief
Justice Bird of the California Supreme
Court, "accepted the fiction that there
is no expectation of privacy in bank
records (Miller)34 or in outgoing telephone call records (Smith)3s because
the user voluntarily conveys this
information to a third party-the bank
(Miller) or the telephone company
(Smith). As a result, the individual user
assumes the risk that the third party
will in turn disclose it to the police
upon request." 36
Clearly, such disparate theories of
privacy cannot be reconciled. While
the approach of the California Supreme
Court provides the possibility of maintaining some modicum of privacy in a
world that is characterized by increasing circulation and stockpiling of
personal information, the approach of
the U.S. Supreme Court has led Professor Yale Kamisar to observe that:
"It is beginning to look as if the only way
someone living in our society can avoid
'assuming the risk' that various intermediary institutions will reveal information to
the police is by engaging in drastic discipline
characteristic of life under totalitarian
regimes ... 37

34U.S. v Miller (1976) 425 U.S. 435.
35Smith v Md. (1979) 442 U.S. 735.
36People v Chapman 36 Cal3d 98, 108.
f.n.5.
37Choper, Kamisar & Tribe, The Supreme
Court: Trends and Developments, 1978-79
at p. 143 (1979).

This disparity is just as apparent in
those areas other than informational
privacy where the courts have been
called upon to determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
For example, in People v Triggs (1973)
8 Ca13d 884, and Smayda v U.s. (9th
Cir., 1965) 352 F2d 25, we find the California Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit taking dramatically different
positions on whether individuals
charged with homosexual conduct in
a public bathroom which was vacant
(except for vice squad officers hidden
in the walls) can be entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy from
clandestine observations by
policemen.
The California Court observed that
"Most persons using public restrooms have
no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of
the state will observe them. The expectation
of privacy a person has when he enters a
restroom is reasonable and not diminished
because the toilet stall being used lacks a
door. (Triggs, supra, at p. 891)

The Ninth Circuit declined to follow
California's lead, finding instead that
the individuals assumed the risk-both
because the stall was not completely
enclosed and also apparently because
people who "resort to such a public
toilet for criminal purposes ... deliberately take the chance that they may
be observed by police officers."
(Smayda, supra, at p. 254).

Garbage and privacy
Trash cans and garbage form the
backdrop of yet another independent
application of the Katz doctrine by the
California Supreme Court, In People v
Krivda (1971) 5 Ca13d 357; vacated 409
U.S. 33; reaffirmed 8 Ca13d 623 (1973),
the Court declared that a householder
retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy against police rummaging
through the contents of a trash can
placed at the curb for collection. Most
federal courts which have dealt with
this issue have tended to find the trash
as having been abandoned and the subsequent police activity as not constituting a search. (See, for example, U.S.
v Shelby (1978) 573 F2d 971).
There is yet another significant area
where the California Courts have taken
a clearcut stand on the legitimacy of
privacy expectations that conflicts
directly with that espoused by the U.S.
Supreme Court. It involves the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment
FORUM /
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applies within a prison context-i.e.
whether prisoners have any expectation
of privacy that is reasonable.
In the past, various pluralities of the
u.s. Supreme Court have expressed
grave doubts on this issue (see, for
example, Lanza v New York (1962) 370
U.S. 139 and Bell v Wolfish (1979) 441
U.S. 520). This past term, however, a
majority specifically held that
"society is not prepared to recognize as
legitimate any subjective expectations of
privacy that a prisoner might have in his
prison cell and . .. accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not
apply within the confines of the prison
cell. ''Hudson v Palmer (1984) 104 S.Ct. 3194
at 3200.

California, on the other hand, in
DeLancie v Superior Court (1982) 31
Cal3d 865 held that sections 2600 and
2601 of the California Penal Code
accord prison inmates a statutory
right to privacy in prisons and jails
that may not be abridged except "to
provide for the reasonable security of
the institution ... and for the
reasonable protection of the public."
Although it is obvious that those two
exceptions contemplate substantial
abridgement of the right, nonetheless,
the Court did specifically hold that the
county jail in question could therefore
not monitor prisoners' conversations
with visitors for the general purpose
of gathering evidence for use in
criminal proceedings, but rather only

to maintain the security of the jail.
The independent course of the
California Courts with respect to the
definition of privacy law in this area
is as clear as it is dramatic. It acquires
greater significance in light of the fact
that the Court continues to move forward in the development of this area
(People v Chapman, supra, decided just
this past summer reaffirms and expands upon the principles of Burrows,
Blair, etc.)-whereas in other substantive areas of search and seizure law,
the Court shows signs of retreating to
a federal standard without ever invoking Proposition 8 (see for example,
People v Superior Court (Valdez) (1983)
35 Cal3d 11 and People v Chavers
(1983) 33 Cal3d 462 which adopt the
standard set out in U.S. v Ross (1982)
456 U.S. 798 for warrantless car
searches.)

Current California cases
The California Court currently has
before it two cases which raise
extremely difficult questions regarding
application of these independently
developed Katz principles: People v
Mayoff, Crim 23608 and People v Cook,
Crim 23651 each present the question
of the reasonableness of privacy expectations against aerial surveillance of
marijuana fields. However the Court
ultimately decides these specific
cases, it is unlikely to retreat in any
significant way from the coherent set
of principles that it has developed in
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this area-principles which have
guided California privacy
expectations for at least the last
decade and a half and which we as
California citizens have every right to
rely upon as a source of legitimacy for
our own subjective expectations under
the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
The theory we have been discussing
would have a number of other significant effects in California. Preeminent
among these would be the possibility
of tying California's constitutional
right to privacy (Article 1, section 1,
California Constitution) to federal
search and seizure analysis. California
has something which the federal
constitution does not have-a specific
protection of the "inalienable" right
to privacy. It was placed in the constitution by a vote of the electorate in
1972. (For what its worth, it passed by
a considerably greater electoral margin
than did the initiative which produced
Proposition 8. 38 If, as we have been
saying, the scope of the Fourth Amendment depends upon which expectations
of privacy society is prepared to accept
as reasonable, here we have a situation
where, quite literally, society has spoken. Not only did they speak up to add
privacy to the list of "inalienable"
rights considered fundamental to a
free people, but they did so in the context of a ballot argument that is one
of the most forceful condemnations of
uncontrolled governmental surveillance
one is likely to find anywhere.
California decisions have long recognized the propriety of looking to such
election brochures as the equivalent
of "legislative history" of initiative
measures (see, for example, Carter v
Com. on Qualifications, etc (1939) 14
Cal2d 179). The California Supreme
Court did this specifically with respect
to the election brochure for Article 1
section 1 (White v Davis (1975) 13 Cal
§ 757, 775). In so doing, the Court in
White quoted the following language
directly from the election brochure as
establishing some of the parameters
of the right to privacy as it now exists
in California:
'~t present there are no effective restraints
on the information activities of government

38Privacy Admendent passed 62.9% to
37.1%; Proposition 8 passed 56.4% to
43.6%. Summary of Vote, Primary
election, compiled by Secretary of State.

and business. This amendment creates a
legal and enforceable right of privacy for
every Californian. "
(Emphasis in original.)
"The right of pnvacy is the right to be left
alone. It is a fundamental and compelling
interest. It protects our homes, our families,
our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions,
our personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the
people we choose. It prevents government
and business interests from collecting and
stockpiling unnecessary information about
us and from misusing information about us
and from misusing information gathered
for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us." (13 Ca13d at 774.)

Needless to say, this language (as
well as much of the rest of the election
brochure) is noteworthy not only because of the vigor with which it champions the cause of personal privacy
but also the specificity with which it
disapproves of certain governmental
conduct.
Rather than leaving the Court to
plumb its own vague intuitions as to
what society might be prepared to
tolerate, this document identifies the
"principle mischiefs" associated with
invasions of privacy so precisely that
the Court felt compelled to list them:
(1) "government snooping" and the secret
gathering of personal information; (2) the
overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government
and business interests; (3) the improper use
of information properly obtained for a
specific purpose, for example, the use of it
for another purpose or the disclosure of it
to some third party; and (4) the lack of a
reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records. (13 Ca13d at 775.)
',I

Needless to say, it is quite difficult to
reconcile "societal understandings"
about privacy of this sort with the
rationale that underlies the informational privacy cases of the U.S.
Supreme Court (U_S. v Miller, supra,
Smith v Maryland, supra, etc.). So too,
the vast body of privacy law that the
California Supreme Court has developed in interpreting Article 1, section
1 conflicts directly with much of that
of the United States Supreme Court
(contrast, for example, Ciiy of Santa
Barbara v Adamson (1980) 27 Ca13d
123 with Village of Belle Terre v
Boraas (1974) 416 U.S. Ion the issue
of whether zoning regulations restricting the number of persons who may
live together in a single household
unit violate the right to privacy. If
Article 1, section 1 has a role to play
26 I FORUM I January-February 1985

here, then it may be a significant one
indeed.
It should probably be pointed out
that the California Supreme Court has
yet to rely upon Article 1, section 1 as
the sole basis for exclusion in a suppression context. However, as was
noted earlier, a majority of the justices do concur that Article 1, section
1 and Article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution (as well as the
Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution) are at least "coextensive when applied to police surveillance in the criminal context." (People
v Crowsen, supra at p. 629). It is not
exactly clear what is meant by this. It
seems reasonable to infer that Justices
Bird and Reynoso (who argue in dissent that Article 1, section 1 expands
privacy rights in the search and seizure context) would vote to enforce
the provision with an exclusionary
remedy. What Justices Kaus and Mosk
meant by the use of the term "coextensive" in the plurality opinion is less
clear. The most obvious interpretation
would seem to be that Article 1, section
1 provides parallel, co-equal authority
for that body of privacy law that the
Court has already developed in the
search and seizure area-even though
the Court has not seen fit to cite it in
the past. This seems reasonable since
the "mischiefs" toward which the
right is directed are precisely those
with which the Court has been confronted in its Article 1, section 13
privacy decisions (i.e. Burrows, Blair,
Chapman, Triggs, etc.)-all of which
have utilized an exclusionary remedy.
Nevertheless, this is all somewhat
beside the point. The theory that is
before us does not require Article 1,
section 1 to be enforced with an exclusionary remedy. The exclusionary rule
would be used to enforce the Fourth
Amendment which would, in turn, be
read in light of the policy underlying
Article 1, section 1.

Compelling interest
One last speculative observation
remains about the possible role for
Article 1, section 1 if it were tied to
Fourth Amendment scope theory, as
the Court observed in White v Davis,
supra, the election brochure "makes
clear that the amendment does not
purport to prohibit all incursion into
individual privacy but rather that any
such intervention must be justified by
a compelling interest." (White v Davis

at p. 775, emphasis added). That is not
the language one traditionally finds in
search and seizure literature and this
may be what led two Justices in People
v Crowsen (supra at p. 629, f.n. 5) to
cast doubt upon its application in a
traditional search and seizure case.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to speculate upon its possible application in
such a context. Could compelling state
interest theory (plus its traditional
companion requirement that the
government use the least drastic means
to achieve its interest) serve as a basis
for strengthening the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as
applied in California? In other words,
could one argue that Article 1, section
1 demonstrates that California's citizens consider privacy so important a
value that they expect it to be violated
only upon a showing of probable cause
(the compelling interest) which has
been demonstrated to a magistrate by
application for a warrant (the least
drastic means)?
Moving back from the speculative
to the concrete, one further area
where the theory would seem to have
obvious application would be in the
area of standing-provided, that is,
that the California Supreme Court
decides in a case that is presently
before it (in re Lance W., Crim. 23551)
that Proposition 8 eliminates the
"vicarious standing" rule in California. Whether Proposition 8 does, in
fact, achieve this result is as arguable
as its effect upon the exlcusionary
rule in general.
It is difficult to see how the theory
is of any assistance in bolstering the
argument for actual retention of the
vicarious standing rule. As articulated
in People v Martin (1955) 45 Cal. 2d
755, and Kaplan v Superior Court
(1971) 6 Cal3d 150, vicarious standing
is based upon theories of greater
deterrence and the imperative of
judicial integrity-rather than any
explicit theory of protecting privacy
expectations. Privacy expectations
really only become relevant once we
have a standing requirement-as the
principle factor in determining who
has standing. Rakas v Illinois, supra.

Law of standing
The theory we have been examining
would be of considerable significance,
however, in interpreting the law of
standing if it is found to be applicable
once again in California. Let us take

an example from the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in this area
and analyze it in light of the assumption that California's privacy laws
would have some bearing on the core
question.
In Rawlings v Kentucky (1980) 448
U.S. 98, petitioner placed a large quantity of drugs in the purse of a female
companion named Cox (apparently with
her consent) just prior to the arrival
of six police officers. In holding that
petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his companion's
purse (which was subsequently
searched), the Court relied on the
following factors: 1) that Rawlings had
known Cox for only a few days; 2) that
"petitioner had never sought or
received access to her purse prior to
that sudden bailment," 3) that
petitioner did not, "have any right to
exclude other persons from access to
Cox's purse" and the fact that a third
person had access to the purse earlier
in the day; 4) the precipitous nature of
the transaction and 5) the fact that
Rawlings admitted he had no subjective expectation of privacy in Cox's
purse because he admitted at the
suppression hearing that he thought
the police might search Ms. Cox's
purse.
Before analyzing this in terms of
California's independent tradition of
privacy it should first be noted that
several of the factors Rehnquist relied
upon in Rawlings might loosely be
referred to as concepts of property
law. Remembering that a state's independent property law may be as important as its privacy law in providing a
source outside the Fourth Amendment
for the legitimization of privacy expectations (Rakas v Illinois, supra at 14344 n. 12), the first point should be that
it is clear that California property law
contemplates that an enforceable bailment can be created between total
strangers. 39 Moreover, first time bailments are every bit as enforceable as
continuing or subsequent ones. 40 Thus,
in California it is much less significant that Rawlings had not "sought or
received access to her purse"
preViously.
The primary factor in Rehnquist's
analysis, however, seems to be Rawlings' lack of exclusive control over
3'See 3 Witkin, Summary of Ca. Law, 8th
Ed., §§ 109 et seq.
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the purse, i.e., the fact that he did not
have the right to exclude others from
access to it as well as the fact that
another individual had had access to
the purse earlier in the day. Such
exclusive control is simply not necessary to establish a protectable privacy
interest in California. The privacy
tradition which has developed with
great clarity in such cases as Burrows,
Blair and Chapman and which is
bolstered emphatically by the legislative history of Article 1, section 1 is
one which contemplates that simply
because an individual sacrifices some
degree of privacy with respect to one
individual or agency does not mean
that he has abandoned any and all
claims of privacy with respect to the
entire world. It is difficult to see how
Rawlings' act of putting drugs in
Cox's purse is any different from Mr.
Burrows putting his money in the
Bank of America. In California, each
has a reasonable expectation that the
government will stay out.
The last important factor in the case
was Rawlings' frank admission that
he did not believe that Cox's purse
would remain free from governmental
intrusion, thus evincing an absence of
any subjective expectation of privacy
on his part. As Professor Wayne
LaFave has pointed out, "The
question (as set forth in footnote 3 of
the opinion) quite obviously asks the
defendant what he thought was going
to happen after the police were on the
scene and after they had told him and
the others that a warrant was being
sought ... But if one can be deprived
of Fourth Amendment standing by
being informed in advance by the
police of the intrusion they intend to
make then it is certainly correct, as
the Rawlings dissenters complained,
that the majority "has turned the
development of the law of search and
seizure on its head." 41 Once again
California law is critical precisely
because it has not been turned on its
head in this fashion. As the California
Supreme Court held in DeLancie v
Superior Court, supra, at p. 876,
"Privacy is not safe if a search or
intrusion can be justified merely by
proof that the state announced its
intention in advance. This court recognized in People v Hyde (1974) 12 Ca13d
41LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on The Fourth Amendment (pp. 192-96
of 1983 pocket part to Vol. 3, §11.3).
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158, that 'such a concept would
sanction an erosion of the Fourth
Amendment by the simple and expedient device of its universal violation.' "
Thus, although Mr. Rawlings may
not have standing in Kentucky, if the
court interprets the Rakas expectation
of privacy standard in light of California's independent body of privacy
and property 'law, there is a strong
argument to be made that he would
have standing for Fourth Amendment
purposes in California.

Privacy statutes
One last area where the theory we
have been discussing might have direct
application is with respect to the vast
array of statutory law that the California legislature has enacted over the
years in order to protect the privacy
expectations of its citizens. We have,
in fact, already seen an example of how
this might work when we looked at
DeLancie v Superior Court, supra.
Although the Court there was not faced
with the larger question of how California statutes might affect the scope
of federal constitutional law, it nonetheless had no difficulty in utilizing
sections 2600 and 2601 of the Penal
code to determine the Katz question
for purposes of California law. A more
expansive use of California statutes to
determine the scope of federal rights
would seem equally appropriate.
California's statutory privacy protections are, in many ways, as impressive
as the protections we have examined
in other contexts. For example, California has the oldest wire tapping prohibition in the world. It prohibited the
interception of telegraph messages in
1862.42 Telephone wiretapping was
first prohibited in 1905 43 and today
the entire area is regulated by the
Invasion of Privacy Act (Cal. P.C. §
§630 to 637.5). The Privacy Act covers
much of the same territory as Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act of 1968 (18 U.S.c. §
§251O-2520) although it differs in at
least two crucial respects: 1) subject
to a law enforcement exception, the
state act requires all parties to consent
to warrantless interceptions of
telephone conversations while the
federal act permits such interception
where the consent of only one party
has been obtained (People v Conklin
(1974) 12 Ca13d 259, 270; and 2) it
42Dash, supra at p.8.
43Id at p. 8.

appears that California has not
authorized the interception of
communications by warrant while
Title III provides express approval for
such law enforcement activity (People
v Conklin, supra at p. 271. f.n. 10).
Another example of an expansive
statutory scheme protecting privacy
may be found in the area of financial
records. California privacy rights in
this area are provided protection
through the Right to Financial Privacy
Act (Government Code sections 74607493, plus amendments to several
other codes). (Federal regulation may
be found in the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-508,84 Stat. 114
et seq.)).
The potential conflicts between
these last two sets of legislation serve
to illustrate the last major issue which
is raised by the theory we have been
examining. This concerns the question
of whether the utilization of state law
in the manner we have been discussing
might run afoul of the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution. So long as we are talking solely
about its application in California
courts, the answer seems to be implicit
within the theory itself. The basic
presupposition is that state law is
part of the federallaw-Le., that the
Fourth Amendment incorporates the
corresponding state law to define its
scope. If state law is, in fact, part of
the federal law then it can hardly be
in conflict and supremacy clause
issues are of little or no concern.
The real problem is that our theory
carries us much further. Precisely
because it purports to explicate
federal law, it leads us to the conclusion that it must be applied in federal
courts sitting in California and it
must control the actions of federal
officials operating in that state. Thus,
for example, federal law enforcement
officers would be bound by-among
other things-the wiretapping provisions of the California Privacy Act.
While the thought that the states
might establish rules governing the
actions of the F.B.I. and the application of federal law in federal courts
might look somewhat attractive in a
state with a progressive tradition such
as California, such a concept does
nonetheless seem to run counter to
traditional approaches regarding the
appropriate allocation of power
between state and federal governments.

j
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Three approaches
There is neither sufficient time nor
space here to explore fully the implications of such an application of the
theory to federal court practice. It is
suggested, however, that there are at
least three separate ways that the
issue might be dealt with in a sufficiently principled manner so as not to
undermine the primary objective,
which is its application in state courts.
The first approach would be to say
the theory simply does not apply in
federal court-that what is required
in federal court by way of the Fourth
Amendment need not be identical to
that which is required in state court
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There has been a strain of incorporation doctrine represented most recently
by Justice Harlan's dissent in Williams
v Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 (the 6
person jury case) and Justice Powell's
concurrence in Apodaca v Oregon
(1972) 406 U.S. 404 (the non-unanimous
jury verdict case) which maintains
that federal rights imposed upon the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment need not mirror the federal
right in every detail. This approach
has not commanded a majority since
the Warren Court abandoned the
"fundamental fairness" standard of
incorporation doctrine in the early
1960's. Nonetheless, it also has not
been considered in light of an approach
such as ours where the "freedom to
experiment" accorded to the states
would be considered only where the
states have chosen to provide greater
protection to individual liberties
rather than less.
The second possible approach is the
neatest conceptually but the least
likely to succeed. This approach would
be identical to the one we utilize in
state court and would maintain that
since any state law we look to is part
of the Fourth Amendment, there is no
supremacy clause problem. If the
theory requires an F.B.I. agent to
follow the guidelines of the California
statutes regulating wiretapping rather
than Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act, that is only because the
policies underlying the California act
have become part of the Fourth
Amendment (when the latter is applied
in California) and certainly a congressional statute such as Title III is
subordinate to the United States
Constitution (Marbury v Madison
(1803) U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178. While

this is interesting as a theoretical
conceit, at least to the extent that it
subordinates congressional regulation
of federal law enforcement goals and
operations to the will of the individual
states, it seems to contradict every
traditional concept of the supremacy
clause and the pre-emption doctrine.
The last approach would contend
that the theory applies in federal

court but that it is subject to
traditional preemption analysis when
the predicate state law conflicts with
acts of Congress. To the extent that
the state law conflicts with prior
Supreme Court decisions on the scope
question it would merely supplement
them and become part of a more fully
explicated Fourth Amendment. But to
the extent that state law actually
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conflicts with an act of Congress
intended to regulate criminal activity
on a national level, it might obstruct
federal law enforcement policy in a
way prohibited by traditional application of the preemption doctrine (see,
for example, Pennsylvania v Nelson
(1956) 350 U.S. 497.
To say that pre-emption theory
might apply is not to say that it
prevents our looking to state law
whenever there is federal legislation
in the field. Pre-emption issues depend
heavily upon determinations of legislative intent and tend to lead to
considerable judicial ad hoc balancing. Thus, the result in any given
case is often far from clear-cut. For
example, we might briefly consider
the effect of the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, supra, upon the utilization of
the banking aspects of Califiornia's
information privacy law as part of
our theory. To the extent that the Act
requires banks to maintain certain
customer records, specifically for the
purpose of facilitating federal tax and
regulatory investigations, it might be
viewed as undermining the principles
espoused in Burrows, supra. However,
both the legislative history of the act
and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto make specific
reference to the fact that access to the

records is to be controlled by legal
process. Since that is all that Burrows
requires, one could argue that at least
this part of the Act does not preempt
California law. Needless to say, if the
courts look favorably upon the theory
in general there will be plenty of time
to develop any pre-emption
implications it might present.

Theory a Longshot
As should now be obvious, the principle problem with this theory is that
the final arbiters of its validity sit on
the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, to
the extent it is novel and ultimately
redounds to the benefit of persons
accused of crime, it must realistically
be assessed as a longshot.
But before we reject it as being
totally unrealistic, it is worth pausing
to look at the authority upon which it
rests.
With virtually no exceptions, every
U.S. Supreme Court case that it relies
upon has been authored by either one
of the moderates or conservatives of
the Court. Furthermore, the theory
really is a conservative one at its core
-at least to the extent that states'
rights and notions of federalism are
still viewed as being conservative in
concept.

Moreover, it is increasingly obvious
that the present majority is engaged
in a process of taking the federal
courts out of the business of protecting federal rights. Along the way, they
keep suggesting that states retain the
power to pick up the slack-either in
terms of traditional independent state
ground theory or, more recently, by
actually defining the scope of federal
rights as they are given application
within the particular states' borders.
Whether this latter concept is merely
rhetoric intended to muffle the sound
of courthouse doors slamming shut or
whether it is a sincere invitation to
state action remains to be seen. But it
is clear that to the extent personal
liberties are to receive any meaningful
protection in the near future, it is the
states which must take the lead. In
the independent state ground area an
impressive array of state courts are
breaking ranks with the U.S. Supreme
Court to do just that. California has,
of course, been at the forefront of this
battle. This article suggests a way in
which California can continue to do
this-even in the face of a regressive
countermeasure such as Proposition
8. 0
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